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Standard models of moral hazard predict a negative relationship 
between risk and incentives; however empirical studies on mutual 
funds present mixed results. In this paper, we propose a behavioral 
principal-agent model in the context of professional managers, 
focusing on active and passive investment strategies. Using this 
general framework, we evaluate how incentives affect the risk 
taking behavior of managers, using the standard moral hazard 
model as a special case; and solve the previous contradiction. 
Empirical evidence, based on a comprehensive world sample of 
4584 mutual funds, gives support to our theoretical model. 
Keywords: Agency Model, Prospect Theory, Mutual Funds. 
JEL Classification: M52 
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This study deals with a relevant financial phenomenon that occurs in several 
markets. There has been tremendous and persistent growth in the prominence of mutual 
funds and professional investors over the recent years, which is relevant for both 
academics and policy makers (Bank for International Settlements, 2003). Nowadays, 
most real world financial  market participants are professional portfolio managers 
(traders), which means that they are not managing their own money, but rather are 
managing money for other people (e.g. pension funds, hedge funds, central banks, 
mutual funds, insurance companies)
5. The value of the assets managed by mutual funds 
rose from $50 billion in 1977 to $4.5 trillion in 1997. Similarly, the assets managed by 
pension plans have grown from around $250 billion in 1977 to 4.2 trillion in 1997 
(Cuoco and Kaniel, 2003). Considering only the United States market during the 
nineties, assets managed by the hedge fund industry experienced exponential growth; 
assets grew from about US$40 billion in the late eighties to over US$650 billion in 
2003. Assets managed by mutual funds exceed those of hedge funds, as total assets 
managed by mutual funds are in excess of US$6.5 trillion 
6(2003). US equity mutual 
funds had total net assets of US$ 4.4 trillion at the end of 2004 (Sensoy, 2006). Related 
to Central Banks, the foreign exchange reserves grew from US$ 2 trillion in 2002 to 
US$ 5.5 trillion in 2007
7.  
The main reasons for the investor to delegate the right of investing their money 
to traders include: customer service (including record keeping and the ability to move 
money around among funds); low transaction costs; diversification; and professional 
management (traders task). Individual investors expect to receive better results, as they 
are provided a professional investment service. However, an important stylized fact of 
the delegated portfolio management industry is the poor performance of active funds 
compared to passive ones (Stracca, 2005). Fernández et al. (2007a,b) found that just 23 
of 649 Spanish funds outperformed their benchmarks. Gil-Bazo and Ruiz-Verdú (2007) 
found that for active US funds, the ones that charge higher fees often obtained lower 
performance. Also, Aragon et. al (2007), considering the complete trading history of all 
stocks listed on the Istanbul Stock Exchange over 1999-2003 period, found no evidence 
                                                 
5 Just 40% of corporate equities are held by individuals (Cuoco and Kaniel, 2003). 
6 Data provided by HedgeCo.net 
7 Data provided by IMF – International Financial Statistics  
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that institutions have superior information about the direction of future stock prices if 
compared to individuals. Thus, active management appears to subtract, rather than add 
value
8. A way to justify the previous empirical evidence is to assume that the delegated 
portfolio management context generates an agency feature that has relevant negative 
consequences. As investors usually lack specialized knowledge (information 
asymmetry), they may evaluate the trader just based on his performance, generating 
early liquidation of the trader’s strategy, and can lead to mispricing. This is called the 
“separation of capital and brains” (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997).  Also, Rabin and 
Vayanos (2007), show that investors move assets too often in and out mutual funds, and 
exaggerate the value of financial information and expertise. 
Despite relevant research on incentives produced in both scientific areas, 
management and economics, the search for integrative models has been neglected. In 
general, management papers usually provide good intuition and interpretation but lack a 
more precise methodology and often reach ambiguous results. On the other hand, 
economic papers are usually tied to classical rationality assumptions and just capture 
one side of the issue. Moreover, standard models of moral hazard predict a negative 
relationship between risk and incentives, but empirical work has not confirmed this 
prediction (Araújo, Moreira and Tsuchida, 2004).   
Building on agency and prospect theory, Wiseman and Gomez-Mejia (1998) 
first proposed a behavioral agency model (BAM) of executive risk taking suggesting 
that the executive risk propensity varies across and within different forms of 
monitoring, and that agents may exhibit risk seeking as well as risk averse behaviors. 
However, this study considered only a single period model applied to the case of 
company CEOs. 
In this study, considering BAM to the professional portfolio manager’s context, 
and using the theory of contracts and behavior-inspired utility functions, we propose an 
integrative model that aims to explain the risk taking behavior of the traders with 
respect to active or passive investment strategies. Our focus is on relative risk taking 
measured against a certain benchmark. We argue that BAM can better explain the 
situation of professional portfolio managers, elucidating the way incentives in active or 
                                                 
8 Fernandez et al. (2007) show that during the last 10 years (1997-2006), the average return of mutual 
funds in Spain (2.7%) was smaller than average inflation (2.9%).  
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passive investment strategies affect the attitudes of traders towards risk
9. Our 
propositions suggest that managers in passively managed funds tend to be rewarded 
without an incentive fee and are risk averse. On the other hand, in actively managed 
funds, whether incentives reduce or increase the riskiness of the fund will depend on 
how hard is to outperform the benchmark. If the fund is likely to outperform the 
benchmark, incentives reduce the manager’s risk appetite, while the opposite is true if 
the fund is unlikely to outperform the benchmark. Furthermore, the evaluative horizon 
influences the trader’s risk preferences, in the sense that if traders performed poorly in a 
period, they tend to choose riskier investments in the following period given the same 
evaluative horizon. Conversely, if traders performed well in a given time period, they 
tend to choose more conservative investments following that period.  We test our 
propositions in a world sample of equity mutual funds, finding supportive results. 
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we first offer a 
brief literature review. Section 3 describes the professional portfolio manager’s context 
and formally presents the model, positing the propositions. Section 4 provides some 
empirical evidence supporting the model and Section 5 concludes with a summary of 
the main findings. 
Literature Review 
The traditional finance paradigm seeks to understand financial markets using 
models in which agents are “rational”. Barberis and Thaler (2003) suggest that 
rationality is a very useful and simple assumption.  This means that when agents receive 
new information, they instantaneously update their beliefs and preferences in a coherent 
and normative way such that they are consistent, always choosing alternatives which 
maximize their expected utility. Unfortunately, this approach has been empirically 
challenged in explaining several financial phenomena, as demonstrated in the growing 
behavioral finance literature
10. The increase in price of a stock which has been included 
in an Index (Harris and Gurel, 1986) and the case of the twin shares which were priced 
                                                 
9 A portfolio manager decides the scale of the response to an information signal (he also decides the 
required effort) and so influences both the level of the risk and the portfolio returns. As pointed out in 
Stracca (2005), in a standard agency problem, the agent controls either the return or the variance, but not 
both. The previous specific characteristic offers its own challenges as the fact that the agent controls the 
effort and can influence risk makes it more difficult for the principal to write optimal contracts.  
 
10 Allias paradox and Ellsberg paradox are two well documented cases where the classical normative 
approach fails to describe the real individual choices.  
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differently (Barberis and Thaler, 2003) are examples of the empirical market anomalies 
found in the literature.  
Agency theory has its foundations in traditional economics assuming the 
previous “rationality” paradigm. The perspective of a separation between ownership and 
management creates conflict as some decisions taken by the agent may be in his own 
interest and may not maximize the principal’s welfare (Jensen and Meckling, 1976).  
This is known as “moral-hazard”, and it is a consequence of the information asymmetry 
between the agent and the principal. We say that an agency relationship has arisen 
between two (or more) parties when one, designated as the agent, acts for the other, 
designated as the principal, in a particular domain of decision problems (Eisenhardt, 
1989).  
Related to the main assumptions, agency theory considers that humans are 
rationally bound, self-interested and prone to opportunism. It explores the consequences 
of power delegation and the costs involved in this context characterized by an agent 
which has much more information than the principal about the firm (information 
asymmetry). The delegation of decision-making power from the principal to the agent is 
problematic in that: (i) the interests of the principal and agent will typically diverge; (ii) 
the principal cannot perfectly monitor the actions of the agent without incurring any 
costs; and (iii) the principal cannot perfectly monitor and acquire information available 
to or possessed by the agent without incurring any costs. If agents could be induced to 
internalize the principal’s objectives with no associated costs, there would be no place 
for agency models (Hart and Homstrom, 1987).  
Moreover, while focusing on divergent objectives that principals and agents may 
present, agency theory considers principals as risk neutrals in the individual actions of 
their firms, because they can diversify their shareholding across different companies. 
Formally, principals are assumed to be able to diversify the idiosyncratic risk but they 
still bear market risk. On the other hand, since agent employment and income are tied to 
one firm, they are considered risk averse in order to diminish the risk they face to their 
individual wealth. (Gomez-Mejia and Wiseman, 1997).  
Hence, current agency literature considers that principals and agents have 
predefined and stable risk preferences and that risk seeking attitudes are irrational. 
Highlighting this fact, Grabke-Rundell and Gomez-Mejia (2002) posit that agency 
theorists give little consideration to the processes in which individual agents obtain their  
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preferences and make strategic decisions for their firms. Some empirical studies have 
shown that people systematically violate previous risk assumptions when choosing risky 
investments, and depending on the situation, risk seeking attitudes may be present. This 
occurrence of risk seeking behavior was already identified by several studies related to 
choices between negative prospects, and the most prominent of these studies is that of 
Kahneman and Tversky (1979) which proposes the prospect theory. 
In general, prospect theory
11 posits four novel concepts in the framework of 
individuals risk preferences: investors evaluate financial alternatives according to gains 
and losses and not according to final wealth (mental accounting); individuals are more 
averse to losses than they are attracted to gains (loss aversion); individuals are risk 
seeking in the domain of losses, and risk averse in the gains domain (asymmetric risk 
preference); and individuals evaluate extreme events in a sense of overestimating low 
probabilities and underestimating high probabilities (probability weighting function). In 
this study, we consider a behavior inspired utility function, in the framework of 
delegated portfolio managers, which takes into account the first three stated concepts.  
Coval and Shumway (2005) found strong evidence that CBOT traders were 
highly loss-averse, assuming high afternoon risk to recover from morning losses. In an 
interesting experiment, Haigh and List (2005) used traders recruited from the CBOT 
and found evidence of myopic loss aversion, supporting behavioral concepts. They 
conclude that expected utility theory may not model professional trader behavior well, 
and this finding lends credence to behavioral economics and finance models as they 
relax inherent assumptions used in standard financial economics. Aveni (1989) in a 
study about organizational bankruptcy posit that creditors wish to avoid recognizing 
losses and thus tend to assume more risk then they would otherwise take.  
Wiseman and Gomez-Mejia (1998) argue that prospect and agency theories can 
be understood as complementing each other for reaching better predictions of risk 
taking by managers. Fernandes et al. (2008), in an analysis of risk factors in forty-one 
international stock markets, show that tail risk is a relevant risk factor. We argue that 
tail risk can be associated with loss aversion and therefore the BAM offers more fruitful 
results in the professional managers’ context.  
                                                 
11 And in its latter version (Tversky and Kahneman, 1992) known as cumulative prospect theory.  
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Now, we will comment on the main criticism received by this approach. 
Traditional rational theorists believe that: (i) people, through repetition, will learn their 
way out of biases; (ii) experts in a field, such as traders in an investment institution, will 
make fewer errors; and (iii) with more powerful incentives, the effects will disappear. 
While all these factors can attenuate biases to some extent, there is little evidence that 
they can be completely eliminated
12. Thaler (2000) suggests that “homo economicus” 
will become a slower learner due to the greater weight to the role of environmental 
factors, such as the difficulty of the task and the frequency of feedback
13. In this paper, 
we address the argument of incentives (iii), showing that in some cases, compensation 
contracts may even induce risk seeking attitudes. 
  As noted by Hart and Holmstrom (1987), underlying each agent model is an 
incentive problem caused by some form of asymmetric information. The literature on 
incentives and compensation contracts is very extensive, both on theoretical and 
empirical studies. Among them there is a consensus about the usefulness of piece-rate 
contracts in order to increase productivity
14. In our study, we approach the professional 
portfolio manager's setting considering a widely used piece-rate contract. 
  Baker (2000) concludes that most real-world incentive contracts pay people on 
the basis of risky and distorted performance measures. This is powerful evidence that 
developing riskless and undistorted performance measures is a costly activity. We 
extend the previous argument showing that the use of risky performance measures 
might be in the interest of companies to induce risk seeking behavior of the agent.  
Araujo, Moreira and Tsuchida (2004) discuss the negative relationship between 
risk and incentives, predicted by conventional  theory but not verified by empirical 
studies. They propose a model with adverse selection followed by a moral hazard, 
where the effort and degree of risk aversion is the private information of an agent who 
                                                 
12 Behavioral literature suggests two types of biases: cognitive and emotional. Cognitive biases 
(representativeness, anchorism, etc) are related to misunderstanding and lack of information about the 
prospect, and can be mitigated through learning. On the other hand, emotional biases (loss aversion, 
asymmetric risk taking behavior, etc) are human intrinsic reactions and may not be moderated. 
13 Thaler (2000) posits that in life, each day is different, and the most important of life’s decisions, such 
as choosing a career or spouse, offer only a few chances for learning. 
14 Lazear (2000a), analyzing a data set for the Safelite Glass Corporation found that productivity 
increased  by 44% as the company adopted a piece-rate compensation scheme. Bandiera, Barankay and 
Ransul (2004) found that productivity is at least 50% higher under piece rates, considering the personnel 
data from a UK soft fruit farm for the 2002 season. Lazear (2000b) stresses that the main reason to use 
piece-rate contracts is to provide better incentives when the workforce is heterogeneous.  
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can control the mean and the variance of profits, and conclude that more risk adverse 
agents provide more effort in risk reduction.  
Palomino and Prat (2002) develop a general model of delegated portfolio 
management, where the risk neutral agent can control the riskiness of the portfolio.  
They show that the optimal contract is simply a bonus contract. In an empirical study, 
Kouwenberg and Ziemba (2004) evaluate incentives and risk taking in hedge funds, 
finding that returns of hedge funds with incentive fees are not significantly more risky 
than the returns of funds without such a compensation contract.  
  Our approach is distinguished from the previous approaches as we consider 
changes in risk preference of the agents depending on how they frame their optimization 
problem rather than assuming risk aversion or risk neutrality from the beginning. 
Agents are still considered to be value maximizers, but we are using behavior-inspired 
utility functions, based on prospect theory. We also focus on relative risk measured 
against a certain benchmark (tracking error), instead of total risk, as this is the relevant 
variable of interest for individual investors to decide whether to put their money in 
passive or active funds. 
The key element to apply prospect theory to our context is to identify what the 
trader perceives as a loss or a gain, in other words, to determine what their reference 
point should be. In the mutual funds industry, benchmarks are widely used and are 
published in their prospects. It is safe to assume the return of the benchmark as the 
trader’s reference point. If he can anticipate a negative frame problem, his loss aversion 
behavior will lead him to go on riskier actions in order to avoid his losses even if there 
are other less risky alternatives which could minimize the loss.  This is based on a 
behavioral effect called "escalation of commitment". The intuition is that, due to the 
convex shape of the value function in the range of losses, risk seeking behavior will 
prevail in the case of prior losses.  
Daido and Itoh (2005) propose an agency model with reference-dependent 
preferences to explain the Pygmalion effect (if a supervisor thinks her subordinates will 
succeed, they are more likely to succeed) and the Galatea effect (if a person thinks he 
will succeed, he is more likely to succeed). They show that the agent with high 
expectations about his performance can be induced to choose a high effort with low-
powered incentives. Empirical evidence of the escalation situation can be found in 
Odean (1998) and Weber and Camerer (1998). They found that investors sell stocks that  
11 
 
trade above the purchase price (winners) relatively more often than stocks that trade 
below the purchase price (losers). Both papers interpreted this behavior as evidence of 
decreased risk aversion after a loss and increased risk aversion after a gain.  
The Decision Making Model 
We consider professional portfolio managers to be traders who are responsible 
for managing the financial resources of others who work for financial institutions such 
as: pension funds, mutual funds, insurance companies, banks, and central banks.  Their 
jobs consist of investing financial resources, selecting assets (e.g. stocks, bonds), and 
often using an index as a reference. Despite high competition in financial markets, we 
argue that traders, as any human beings, are continuously dealing with their own 
emotional biases which make their attitudes toward risk different depending on how 
they frame the situation they face. 
A characteristic that can affect trader behavior is if the funds they manage have a 
passive or active investment strategy. Under active management, securities in the 
portfolio and other potential securities are regularly evaluated in order to find specific 
investment opportunities.  Managers make buy/sell decisions based on current and 
projected future performance. This strategy, while tending toward more volatile 
earnings and transaction costs, may provide above-average returns. In this case, traders 
must be much more specialized because results are directly related to how they choose 
among different assets and allocate the resources of the fund in order to obtain better 
profits.  
On the other hand, in the passive strategy, the portfolio is settled to follow a 
predetermined index, such as the S&P500 or the FTSE100, with the idea of mimicking 
market performance (tracking the index). Traders are much more worried about 
constructing a portfolio similar to the index than in trying to find investment 
opportunities. In this situation, a trader’s activity can be specified in advance as it 
consists of allocating the resources closely to a predetermined public index, and then it 
is much more programmable and predictable, which raises the possibility for better 
control. This strategy requires less administrative costs, tends to avoid under-market 
returns and lessens transaction costs. However, because of their commitment to 
maintaining an exogenously determined portfolio, managers of these funds generally 
retain stocks, regardless of their individual performance.   
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The approach suggested by Eisenhardt (1985) yields task programmability, 
information systems, and uncertainty as determinants of control strategy (outcome or 
behavior based). Outcome-based contracts transfer risk from the principal to the agent 
and it is viewed as a way of mitigating the agency costs involved. But this rewarding 
package has a side effect, as appropriate behaviors can lead to good or bad outcomes. It 
is a very complex problem to isolate the effect of the specific agent’s behavior on the 
outcome, especially in businesses with high risk. Contingent pay will be more effective 
in motivating agents when outcomes can be controlled or influenced by them. Bloom 
and Milkovich (1998) posit that higher levels of business risk not only make it more 
difficult for principals to determine what actions agents take, but also make it more 
difficult for principals to determine what actions agents should take. 
In line with the agency literature (Holmstrom and Milgrom, 1987; 1991), we 
model the interaction between a risk neutral, profit maximizer principal and a value-
maximizing agent in a competitive market. The principal delegates the management of 
his funds to the agent, whose efforts can affect the probability distribution of the 
portfolio excess return - differential return for a given portfolio, relative to a certain 
benchmark
15,  () ) ( ), (
2 t t N x x x b p σ μ → − = . The agent's task is related to obtaining 
information about expected returns and defining portfolio strategies. The agent chooses 
an effort level “t” incurring in a personal cost C(t). We consider the general differential 
assumptions for C(t): C’(t) > 0 and C’’(t) > 0. Also, let’s call  0 C  the agent’s minimum 








C t C + =            (1)
17 
And, the portfolio excess return is given by: 
) ( ) ( t t x ε μ + =           (2) 
                                                 
15 xp is the portfolio return and xb is the return of the benchmark. 
16 This cost is related to the index tracking activity and can be estimated considering the ETF’s (Exchange 
Traded Funds) total management fee. 




where  ) (t μ  is concave and increasing, referring to the part of the return due to 
his level effort (t). Also take ε(t) ~ N(0, σ
2(t)). In order to simplify, we assume that the 
performance of the trader has a linear relationship with his efforts plus a random 
variable, so that: t t μ μ = ) ( , and then: 
) (        t t x ε μ + =           (3) 
  Moreover, the timing of the proposed principal-agent game is: (i) the 
principal proposes a contract to the agent; (ii) the agent may or may not accept the 
contract, and if he accepts, he receives an amount of funds to invest; (iii) the reference 
point of the agent is defined; (iv) the agent chooses the level of effort (related to his 
personal investment strategy) to spend; (v) the outcome of the investment is realized 
and the principal pays the agent using part of the benefits generated by the chosen 
strategy and keeps the remaining return.
18 
In this case the certainty equivalent of the agent’s utility, as proposed in 
Holmstrom and Milgrom (1991), can be given by: 
[]
) ( '








t t C x w E CEa α σ + − =           (4) 
where E[w(x)] is the expected wage of the trader, considered as a function of the 
information signal (excess return), α  is the performance pay factor, and  ) (x v is the 
trader’s value function, which depends on x, the agent’s perceived gain or loss related 
to his reference point (benchmark). In the previous model, 
β αε αμ β α + + = + = ) ( ) ( t t x x w , and so  [] . ) ( ) (
2 2 t x w Var σ α =  
The value function was proposed in the prospect theory of Kahneman and 
Tversky (1979) and is an adaptation of the standard utility function in the case of the 
behavior approach. The ratio 
) ( '




v  is the coefficient of absolute risk aversion. For a 
risk averse agent, this ratio is negative and the certainty equivalent is less than the 
expected value of the gamble as he prefers to reduce uncertainty. This is the origin of 
the negative relationship between risk and incentives in moral hazard models. 
                                                 
18 It's important to highlight that this timing is appropriate in the institutional investor's framework. For 
the case of individual investor's, the fund usually offer a pre-specified product for the individual, and the 
later has little power to influence in it.  
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Let  t* denote the agent’s optimal choice of effort, given α. Note that t* is 
independent of β. The resulting indirect utility is given by:  ) ( ) , ( α β β α v V + = , where 
2 2 *) (
) ( '
) ( ' '
2
1
*) ( *) ( ) ( t
x v
x v
t C t v σ α αμ α + − =  is the non-linear term. The marginal utility of 
incentives can then be derived: 
2 *) (
) ( '








α + = =
∂
∂           (5) 
and if we were considering risk averse agents, it would represent the mean of the 
excess profits minus the marginal risk premium.  
The effort of the agent leads to an expected benefits function B(t) which accrues 
directly to the principal. Let’s consider B(t) = xb + x. The principal’s expected profit 
(which equals certainty equivalent as he is risk neutral) is given by: 
[] ) ( ) ( x w E t B CE p − =           (6) 












C x x CE CE TCE b p a σ α + − − + = + =           (7) 
The optimal contract is the one that maximizes this total surplus subject to the 
agent’s participation constraint (CEa≥0). Adapting the previous model to the 
professional manager’s case and considering mental accounting, loss aversion and 
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          (8) 
where r is the coefficient of absolute risk preference, λ  is the loss aversion 
factor which makes the value function steeper in the negative side; and x is the 
perceived gain or loss, rather than final states of welfare, as proposed by Kahneman and 
Tversky (1979). It is useful to consider the previous form for the value function because 
of the existence of a CAPM equilibrium (Giorgi et al., 2004) and because we reach 
constant coefficients of risk preference. The following graph indicates  ) (x v when r = 0.88 





Insert Figure 1 about here 
----------------------------------------- 
We assume a general symmetric compensation contract applied to the situation 
presented in this paper. Starks (1987) shows that the “symmetric” contract, while it does 
not necessarily eliminate agency costs, dominates the convex (bonus) contract in 
aligning the manager’s interests with those of the investor. Also, Grinblatt and Titman 
(1989) posit that penalties for poor performance should be at least as severe as the 
rewards for good performance
19. 
β α + = x x w ) (           (9) 
This indicates that the agent is paid a base salary β plus an incentive fee 
calculated as a proportion α of the total excess return of the fund (the performance 
indicator) compared to a certain benchmark. The previous contract arrangement follows 
the optimal compensation scheme defined in Holmstrom and Milgrom (1987), and was 
also used in Carpenter (2000). Lazear (2000b) argues that continuous and variable pay 
is appropriate in case of worker heterogeneity as in the case of professional portfolio 
managers. Finally, let’s call ψ the probability that the fund outperforms the benchmark 
and (1 – ψ) the likelihood that it performs poorly. So, we can re-write the TCE, CEa and 
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(11) 
β α − − + = x x CE b p ) 1 (           (12) 
 
                                                 
19 In 1970, US Congress amended the Investment Advisors Act of 1940 allowing contracts with registered 
investment companies to specify compensation based on performance, provided that it is of the “fulcrum” 
type, that is, provided that it includes penalties for underperforming a given benchmark that are 
symmetric to the bonuses for exceeding it.  
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The Case of Passive Funds 
Investors in passive funds have expectations of receiving average market returns 
(E(xp) = E(xb) and E(x) = 0), and trader actions are limited and tied in relation to the 
process of buying and selling assets to adjust stock weights in the portfolio in order to 
follow the benchmark. The agent’s task is more programmable and his behavior is easy 
to monitor (“t” is observable by the principal). As the principal has no interest that the 
agent goes on riskier strategies than that of the benchmark, he should set α = 0. Thus, 
























C CEa β ψ β ψ           (13) 
which implies that t* = 0. Optimally, the agent will make no effort to beat the 
benchmark. An important aspect considered in this paper is the competitive situation in 
the market of professional portfolio managers, which is of crucial importance in 
determining who extracts the surplus from the agency contract. We considered, as it is 
usual in the delegated portfolio managers' literature, a perfect competition among agents  
with the entire surplus accrued to the principal. This situation implies that: CEa = 0 and 
0 C = β . The certainty equivalent of the principal would be given by: CEp = xb – C0. 
The principal pays the agent a base salary which is equal to the agent’s cost of 
effort to ensure the investor receives the return of the benchmark (say the agent's choice 
of effort represents the minimum level needed to replicate the benchmark portfolio). 
Moreover, if the agent chooses a level of effort different from C0, the performance of 
the fund will not be tied to the performance of the benchmark and so σ
2(x) > 0 
(increased the risk). If the agent just receives the base salary alone, he doesn’t have any 
incentive to choose a level of effort different from C0 and so performs in a risk averse 
way. Also, because of employment risk, managers tend to decrease risk in order to 
prevent potential job loss (Kempf et al, 2007). 
In this incentive scheme, there’s no risk premium associated with the agent’s 
decisions. Recall that in this case t is observable, and then if the trader chooses t ≠ 0, the 
investor will notice and just fire him. Finally, in this case, there is no reason for using 
incentive fees, as the trader is not responsible for the earnings of the fund, which should 
be equal to the performance of the benchmark. Observe that the previous result is robust 
for different levels of risk preference as it is independent of the value function of the  
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agent, regardless of whether he is risk averse or risk seeking. Summing up, we can 
construct the following table: 
----------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 1 about here 
----------------------------------------- 
Proposition One: Traders in passively managed funds tend to be rewarded 
with a base salary (α = 0). 
Proposition Two: Traders in passively managed funds are more likely to 
perform as risk adverse agents (t = 0). 
  In practice, funds charge their clients a management fee, which they use to cover 
their operational costs and compensate their traders. We expect to find that in the case 
of passive funds, the management fee might be lower when compared to active funds, as 
there’s no need for variable pay to compensate their traders.  
The Case of Active Funds 
In the case of an active fund, investors are usually expecting to receive above-
average risk adjusted returns as they consider it linked to the expertise of the traders. 
The trader has to make investment decisions, and a great number of these decisions are 
based on his own point of view of the market, raising a relevant problem of information 
asymmetry (moral hazard). In this case, the first best results are no longer feasible and 
outcome-based rewards are often used as part of their contracts and the agent is 
stimulated to go on risky alternatives in order to reach above-average returns. Hence, 
the idea of the contract is to reduce objective incongruence between the principal 
(investor) and agent (trader), and to transfer risk to the agent. 
  We now examine two cases. In the single task case, the agent’s effort affects 
only the mean of the excess return. In the multitask case, the agent’s effort influences 
both the expected return and the risk of the portfolio. 
Single task 
  We first analyze the case in which the agent’s effort controls only the 
mean of the excess profits and so the risk is exogenous: 
2 2 ) ( σ σ = t . Consider a loss 
averse agent with a value function given by (Eq. 08). The main point in applying  
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prospect utility is to define the reference point by which the manager measures his gains 
and losses. It seems reasonable in the funds industry to assume the returns of the public 
benchmark published by the fund as a reference point, since it is the one used by 
individual investors when deciding which fund to invest in. Thus, the total certainty 
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C t C + = .  As expected, efforts in outperforming the 
benchmark increases with incentives. The agent’s marginal utility of incentives is given 
by: 
) ) 1 ( (
2 2 λ ψ ψ σ α αμ α − − − = r v           (16) 
So the effect of incentives on the agent’s utility will depend on whether the 
benchmark is likely to be outperformed. Suppose that the fund can easily outperform the 
benchmark. In this case, the probability that the return of the fund is greater than the 
benchmark,  ψ, is close to one and  0 > μ . Then,  2 2 σ α αμ α r v − = , which is the usual 
solution found by moral hazard models. This implies that an increase in incentives has 
both positive and negative effects on the utility of the agent. The positive effect results 
from the share of the positive excess return, and the negative effect comes from the 
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  So the relationship between risk and return is ambiguous, depending on 
how likely it is to outperform the benchmark. As previous experiments have shown that 
the value for λ is around 2 (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979) if ψ is higher than 67%, then 
a negative relationship between risk and incentives is predicted by the model. However, 
as we decrease ψ, a positive relation between risk and return appears.  
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and therefore, increases in 
2 σ  and r  imply decreases in α . The previous 
negative relationship between risk (σ
2) and incentives (α) is the usual standard result 
obtained by moral hazard models. However our model generalizes this, and the previous 
result is simply a special case. If we consider a benchmark that is difficult to 
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and, therefore, increases in 
2 σ  and r  imply increases in α . Some empirical 
papers have found previous positive relationships between risk and return (Sensoy, 
2006). 
Recall that 
2 σ  in our model represents a variance in the differential portfolio 
which uses the benchmark as its reference (tracking error).  The performance of the 
benchmark xB and the performance of the chosen portfolio xP are respectively given by: 
B B B x E x ε + = ) (  ,   with  ) , 0 ( ~
2
B B N σ ε  
, ) ( P P P x E x ε + =    with  ) , 0 ( ~   
2
P P N σ ε   
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Also we consider that the expected return of the benchmark is normalized to 
zero {E(xB) = 0} and the expected return of the portfolio is a function of the agent’s 
choice of effort {E(xP) = μt}. Therefore, the return of the differential portfolio is given 
by: 
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B σ σ =  (i.e. the total risk of the 
portfolio selected by the manager is the same as the total risk of the benchmark 
portfolio, so based on portfolio theory, both portfolios should be equivalent in terms of 
risk/return trade-off), where ρ is the correlation coefficient between the chosen portfolio 
and the benchmark. Therefore, α can be rewritten as: 
[] λ ψ ψ ρ σ μ
μ
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which suggests that increases in α  imply increases in  ) 1 (
2 2
P ρ σ − , and also 
implies a decreasing correlation (ρ), for low values of ψ. Thus, using the benchmark as 
a filter reduces uncontrollable risk by (1 – ρ). If the agent just reproduces the benchmark 
(passive strategy), the correlation is equal to 1 (perfect correlation), all risk can be 
filtered out, and the first best can be achieved. Because of the agency problem, we see 
that the agent’s choice will depend on the degree of idiosyncratic risk associated with 
his contract, as measured by  ) 1 (
2
P ρ σ − . Unlike standard portfolio theory (Markowitz, 
1952), idiosyncratic risk will play a role in incentive schemes. 
Proposition Three: Traders in actively managed funds tend to be rewarded 
in incentive-base pay (α > 0).  
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Proposition Four: The relationship between incentives and risk can either 
be positive or negative depending on the likelihood ψ of outperforming the 
benchmark. High (low) values of ψ imply a negative (positive) relationship.  
 
----------------------------------------- 




We now introduce the possibility that the agent can also influence the risk of the 
portfolio’s excess return. Let tμ and tσ be the effort in mean increase and in variance 
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which implies that endogenous risk can be lower or greater than exogenous risk 
depending on whether the agent is framing a gain or loss situation. If the benchmark is  
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t , and so endogenous risk 
and incentives are negatively related. On the other hand, if the agent is framing a loss 



















t , and a positive 
relationship between risk and incentives is predicted.  
Summing up, our model predicts that when the fund manager is facing a 
situation of high likelihood to outperform the benchmark, he will frame the portfolio 
construction problem in the gain domain, and will act in a risk averse way, and 
incentives will stimulate him to exert efforts to reduce risk and improve the expected 
excess return. Incentives are lower in riskier portfolios. On the other hand, when he is 
facing a situation of low likelihood to outperform the benchmark, the agent is likely to 
frame the investment problem in the loss domain, and incentives will make him look for 
riskier alternatives. Incentives are higher in riskier portfolios. 
Multi-period analysis 
In this section, we discuss the effect of previous outcomes in the future risk 
appetite of the agent. Wright, Kroll and Elenkov (2002) posit that institutional owners 
exerted a significant positive influence on risk taking in the presence of growth 
opportunities. Gruber (1996) showed that in the American economy, actively managed 
funds assumed greater risk, but reached lower average returns compared to passively 
managed funds.  
Hence, in some sense, we have the investment strategy and the contract 
arrangements disciplining the risk taking behavior of the agent.  However we are aware 
that the trader’s cognitive biases moderate this relationship. In this study, we do not deal 
with the way these biases moderate the relationship as a deeper psychological analysis 
of the trader in his context is required, and we also assume that cognitive biases can be 
moderated. 
Going further in the analysis of the relationship with risk-return, we can apply 
Miller and Bromiley´s (1990) multiperiod approach to the professional investor 
environment, taking into account the evaluative period. We assume that a company has 
a target performance level which for instance corresponds to the performance of a  
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chosen index and the firm provides a report annually to the investors. Investors and 
traders are likely to consider this target as the reference point for gain/loss analysis.  
Supposing that in the first semester, this company performed poorly and so the 
likelihood of outperforming the benchmark is lower, the loss aversion of the agent will 
make him choose risky projects in the second semester hoping to convert losses into 
gains until the end of the year. On the other hand if the company performed well in the 
first period, the agent will only accept an increase in risk if the investment opportunity 
offers high expected returns. In this case, the trader tends to reduce his relative risk 
exposure and follow the index in the second semester in order to guarantee the return 
obtained in the previous period. This is based on a behavioral effect called "escalation 
of commitment". In other words, if the fund performed well in the first period, the 
likelihood of outperforming the benchmark is higher (greater ψ) and the trader is more 
likely to perform in a risk averse way (gain domain). Weber and Zuchel (2003) found 
that subjects in the "portfolio treatment" take significantly greater risks following a loss 
than a gain.  
Deephouse and Wiseman (2000) found supportive evidence to these risk-return 
relationships in a large sample of US manufacturing firms. Odean (1998) and Weber 
and Camerer (1998) provide empirical evidence of the escalation situation; these studies 
found that investors sell stocks that trade above the purchase price (winners) relatively 
more often than stocks that trade below purchase price (losers). Both works interpreted 
this behavior as evidence of decreased risk aversion after a loss and increased risk 
aversion after a gain. Chevalier and Ellison (1997) also found supportive empirical 
evidence that an agent with a low interim result is tempted to look for high-risk 
investments. 
Proposition Five: If traders performed (well) poorly in a period, they tend to 
choose (less risky) riskier investments in the following period, considering 
both in the same evaluative horizon. 
  Basak et al. (2003) state that as the year-end approaches, when the fund's year-
to-date return is sufficiently high, fund managers set strategies to closely mimic the 
benchmark; however they argue that this is because of the convexities in the manager's 
objectives. We extend this approach, stating that the previous proposition is a direct 




  Despite the fact that most mutual funds adopt a symmetric compensation 
contract, there are a few which use asymmetric option-based contract as follows: 
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where γ is usually called the performance fee. If we considered an incentive scheme, as 
defined in Eq. 23, the main conclusions of our model would remain with the expression 
(21) now given by: 
[] λ ψ ψ σ μ
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  As can be seen, the only effect of γ would be to increase the negative relation 
between incentives and risk, in the case of an easy to be outperformed benchmark. If the 
benchmark is difficult to outperform, the performance fee has no effect. Probably due to 
its diminished effect on risk, the performance fee is not common. Empirical papers 
(Kouwenberg and Ziemba, 2004; Golec and Starks, 2002) found mixed results related to 
the impact of performance fees on risk taking behavior. 
  Table 3 provides a summary of the main formulas for α in all the cases 
considered. From the model, we can state the following predictions to be tested in the 
empirical section of this paper: 
1.  Passive funds have lower management fees than active funds
20; 
2.  Asymmetric contracts are less common than symmetric contracts; 
3.  Active funds which are likely to outperform the benchmark show a negative 
relationship between relative risk (tracking error) and incentives. 
4.  Active funds which are likely to under perform the benchmark will show a 
positive relationship between relative risk (tracking error) and incentives; 
                                                 
20 We can consider the management fee of a passive fund as a proxy for the β in our compensation 
scheme, and in this case, as predicted by the model, the management fee for passive funds should be 
lower than for active funds. The management fee is a percentage of the wealth under management and 
consists of two components: a fixed flat fee and a performance adjusted fee. The performance adjusted 




5.  Active funds under performing the benchmark in one given period tend to 
increase their relative risk (tracking error) in the subsequent period. 
----------------------------------------- 





  For our empirical investigation, we used the Bloomberg cross-sectional equity 
mutual funds database for February 2007
21. There are 4584 funds using 26 different 
equity benchmarks (stock indices) from 15 countries
22. The database includes emerging 
markets (Brazil, Mexico) as well as developed countries (United States, United 
Kingdom, Germany)
23. As the theoretical model proposed in this paper is always 
dependent on the reference considered, all the analysis is performed separately for each 
benchmark. As in the funds market, the use of a public benchmark is widespread (Elton 
et al., 2003), we assume that fund managers tend to be evaluated and compensated using 
the benchmark as the reference point, to which gains and losses are defined. 
  Table 4 provides some descriptive statistics of the funds in the database. The 
funds were grouped by the benchmark they use to evaluate their performance, and so we 
can consider that they compete for the same class of investors. The number of funds for 
each benchmark varies from 32 (Austrian Stock Exchange) to 1332 (S&P500). From the 
list of funds, just 261 (5.67%) use performance fees indicating that this sort of 
asymmetric compensation contract is not common, except for Brazil (IBOVESPA), 
where 18.10% of the funds charge performance fees.  
The mean management fee among the entire sample is 1.36% (median 1.25%). 
Mexican funds charge the highest management fees (mean 4.84%) and U.S. funds, 
                                                 
21 Despite the fact that we are considering data for an specific month (cross section analysis), we still 
believe in the external validity of the main findings due to the diverse sample and stable econometric 
results. 
22 All funds in the database are alive in January, 2007. Unfortunately data on the dead funds for the 
sample used was not available. 
23 We also used daily data from January 2002 to February 2007 for 739 funds from France, United States, 
Brazil and Japan in a total of 787.216 day-fund-return data from the Bloomberg time series database in 
order to validate the results based on the cross-sectional Bloomberg data.  
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which use the Russell 3000 index benchmark, have the lowest management fee (mean 
0.68%). The average volatility of management fees is 0.97, highest in Brazil (1.77) and 
lowest in Taiwan (0.25). In terms of net asset value (given in the country’s currency), 
the mean is usually much higher than the median indicating the concentration of the 
market, with few large funds and many small ones. In terms of fund’s age, we have a 
sample of established funds with an average age of 10.55 years and a median ranging 
from 5.99 (IBOVESPA) to 16.79 (Germany REX Total Index). 
----------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 4 about here 
----------------------------------------- 
  We have a representative cross country sample of established mutual funds, 
diversified in terms of size. The global nature of the data can surely provide good 
insight for testing the theoretical model proposed previously in this study. 
Empirical Results 
  In order to test our propositions, we will first distinguish between active and 
passive funds. From our predictions, passive funds should have a lower variable pay 
factor (Propositions 1 and 3) when compared to active funds. Typically, funds may 
charge investors management fees as a proportion of the total assets value, and 
performance fees, paid if the return of the fund outperforms the one obtained by the 
benchmark. We already observed that performance fees (asymmetric contracts) are not 
common. Thus, funds charge the management fee and use it to compensate the traders 
and face other operational costs. As we previously discussed in the theoretical model, 
management fees and performance fees act in the same direction in terms of influencing 
trader behavior, and thus the latter is not really a requirement. We expect that passive 
funds charge lower management fees as they use it to set the trader’s base salary (β), 
since incentives (α) are not necessary. 
Table 5 provides the average mean of the management fee for the funds for each 
benchmark, distinguishing between active and passive
24 funds. The last column shows 
the t statistics and p-values for the differences among means.  
 
                                                 




Insert Table 5 about here 
----------------------------------------- 
From the results, it can be seen that active funds charged higher management 
fees in 14 of the 16 cases and that this difference is significant at the 5% level in 7 of the 
16 indices considered. If we consider the entire sample of mutual funds (All), evidence 
suggests that active funds charge higher fees. In this sense, propositions 1 and 3 are 
given empirical support, and the level of the management fee for passive funds can be 
used as a proxy for the base compensation considered in the model. For instance, 
considering the benchmark SPX, funds charge 0.66% of the total assets value to pay the 
trader’s base salary and other operational costs, and any increments on the management 
fee are used as incentives
25.  
Consider the implications of proposition 2, which implies that in general, active 
managed funds assume a higher risk than passive funds (passive fund managers are risk 
averse). Recall, that the risk we are considering in the model is relative to the 
benchmark (tracking error). We use the variable()
2 1 − β  as a proxy of the tracking 
error
26. Table 6 provides the average mean of the previous risk variable for the funds for 
each benchmark, distinguishing between active and passive funds. We considered both 
a short term beta calculated over the previous 6 months (using daily data) and a long 
term beta calculated over the previous 2 years (using monthly data). 
The results indicate that both the short-term and long-term tracking error for 
passive funds are lower than for active funds, as predicted by proposition 2
27. The 
difference is statistically significant (5% level) for 22 out of 32 cases. If we consider the 
entire sample, the results are similar.  
 
 
                                                 
25 In the case of benchmarks DJST (US) and MEXBOL (Mexico), the management fee for passive funds 
is higher than for active funds; however the difference is not statistically significant. 
26 This proxy is valid if we assume CAPM and the same market portfolio (benchmark) for all funds. 
()
2 2 1 Bench TE σ β − = . (Carroll et al., 1992) 
27 The two indexes where the tracking error was greater for passive funds than for active funds is in the 
case of the Dow Jones Industrial Index (INDU) (the difference is not significant) and in the case of 




Insert Table 6 about here 
----------------------------------------- 
From our model (proposition 4), the relationship between incentives and risk 
depends upon the likelihood of outperforming the benchmark. In order to test this, we 
assume that, considering the sample of funds for each benchmark, the group of funds 
with better past-performance is more likely to frame a gain situation and so risk and 
incentives should have a negative relationship. On the other hand, the group of funds 
with the worse past-performance is more likely to frame a loss situation and act in a risk 
seeking way (risk and incentives should have a positive relationship). In this sense, we 
evaluated both the short term and long term relative risk strategies of the fund 
managers.  
For the short term strategy we considered the returns in the first half of the year. 
The funds classified as winners are those with a previous return in the top 25% 
percentile, and the losers are those with returns in the bottom 25%
28. We then 
regressed
29 the following 6-month tracking error, taking the management fee as the 
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where i is the reference the fund, N is the number of funds for a specific benchmark, C0, 
C1 and C2 are the regression coefficients, β  is the 6-month beta for the second half of 
the year, mf is the fund’s management fee, dl is a dummy variable which equals 1 if the 
fund is a loser (considering the past 6 month return) and zero otherwise, and dw is a 
dummy variable which equals 1 if the fund is a winner (considering the past 6 month 
return) and zero otherwise. This is a cross-sectional regression for all funds in each 
benchmark index. The results are presented in Table 7. 
                                                 
28 This definition for the dummy variables will be the same for the remaining regressions. Observe that 
they are not complementary as there are funds which are classified neither as losers nor as winners. 
29 We used White’s (1980) heteroskedasticity consistent covariance matrix. 
30 Our measure of tracking error is non-negative by definition and then we run the regression on the 
natural logarithm of the measure in order to improve the normality of the residuals  
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  We can observe that C1 is positive in 24 out of 26 cases and significant in 14 
cases. C2 is negative in 12 out of 26 cases and significant in 11 out of 26. Therefore the 
data suggest that for loser funds, the relationship between incentives and risk is positive, 
and for winners this relationship is negative. The empirical results give some support to 
proposition 4, especially in the case of loser funds. However, both C1 and C2 were 
significant with the expected signs in only four cases.  
----------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 7 about here 
----------------------------------------- 
For the long term strategy we considered the returns obtained in the first 2 years 
of the last 4 years, and classified them as winners and losers, depending on whether the 
fund was in the top 25% or in the bottom 25% of funds. We then regressed the tracking 
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where i refers to the fund, N is the number of funds for a specific benchmark, C0, C1 and 
C2 are the regression coefficients, β  is the 2 years beta for the last 2 years, mf is the 
fund’s management fee, dl is a dummy variable which equals 1 if the fund is a loser 
(considering the past 2 years return) and zero otherwise, and dw is a dummy variable 
which equals 1 if the fund is a winner (considering the past 2 years return) and zero 
otherwise. This is a cross sectional regression for all funds in each benchmark index. 
The results are presented in the following Table. 
----------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 8 about here 
----------------------------------------- 
  We may observe that C1 is positive in 24 out of 26 cases and significant in 16 
cases, while C2 is negative in 16 out of 26 cases and significant in only 2 out of 26. 
Therefore the data suggest that for loser funds, the relationship between incentives and  
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risk is positive, but for winners the evidence is weaker. The empirical results give some 
support to proposition 4, especially in the case of loser funds. However, only in two 
cases are both C1 and C2 significant with the expected signs.  
If we add to control variables for size and the age
31 of the fund the regression  as 
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 we reach the results presented in Table 9: 
C1 is positive in 24 out of 26 cases and significant in 17 cases, while C2 is 
negative in 17 out of 26 cases and significant in only 5 out of 26. Results are similar to 
Table 8. The empirical results give some support to proposition 4, especially in the case 
of loser funds. However, only in three cases are both C1 and C2 significant with the 
expected signs. Also, C3 is negative (positive) in 16 (10) out of 26 cases and significant 
in 4 (3) cases, so no clear pattern emerges. C4 is negative in 19 out of 26 cases and 
significant in 10 out of 26, which suggests that smaller funds have larger tracking errors. 
----------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 9 about here 
----------------------------------------- 
  The previous result sheds light on the problem of relating incentives to risk 
taking behavior, indicating that the mixed results found in previous empirical papers are 
probably due to a framing problem. Sensoy (2006) found that tracking error is greater, 
among funds with stronger incentives, while the agency theory predicts a negative 
relationship. The relationship between incentives and risk seems to depend on the 
reference, and this result is robust over various financial markets (developed and 
emerging markets). The asymmetry in the risk taking behavior is likely to be an 
invariant of the decision making process. Another interesting result is that typically the 
                                                 
31 We actually used the natural logarithm of age and size.  
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coefficient for C1 is higher than that for C2, indicating the loss aversion in human 
behavior
32.  
  Empirical studies of incentives and risk taking in the literature typically test if 
funds with poor performance in the first half of the year increase risk in the second half 
of the year (Chevalier and Ellison, 1997). In the framework of prospect theory, this will 
happen because loss averse managers will always increase risk as their wealth drops 
below the threshold, and this effect will be more pronounced for funds with higher fees. 
  Related to proposition 5, we implemented the following cross-sectional 
regression: 
() i i i i dw C dl C C ε β + ⋅ + ⋅ + = − 2 1 0
2 1 log  
, where C0, C1 and C2 are the regression coefficients, β  is the 6 month beta for the 
second half of the year, dl is a dummy variable which equals 1 if the fund is a loser 
(considering the past 6 month return), and dw is a dummy variable which equals 1 if the 
fund is a winner (considering the past 6 month return). The results are presented in 
Table 10. 
  Typically, we verify the relationship that a fund increases the risk if it under 
performs in the first half of the year and decreases risk if it outperforms.  This supports 
proposition 5, and is in line with other empirical papers (Elton et al., 2003). 
----------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 10 about here 
----------------------------------------- 
  Finally, in terms of the use of the performance fee, we already commented that it 
is not common in the sample and that less than 6% of funds use this fee. However, for 
Brazil (IBOVESPA) and the United States (S&P500), we could observe more funds 
using the performance fee. From the model, funds with a performance fee should have a 
higher tracking error. We tested this for the previous two indices and found supportive 
results
33.  
                                                 
32 The mean value for abs(C1) in Table 7 is 0.69 while that of abs(C2) is 0.51 (the p value for the 
difference = 0.05). 
33 Funds that use performance fees have a higher tracking error, indicating that the performance fee acts to 




  In this study we applied the Behavior Agent Model to the professional investor 
environment, using the theory of contracts, and focused on the situation of active or 
passive investment strategies. In a deductive way, we formulated five propositions 
linking investment strategy, compensation and risk taking in a professional investor’s 
context.  
  Our propositions suggest that managers in passively managed funds tend to be 
rewarded without incentive fee and are risk averse. On the other hand, in actively 
managed funds, whether incentives that reduce or increase the riskiness of the fund 
depends on how hard it is to outperform the benchmark. If the fund is likely to 
outperform the benchmark, incentives reduce the manager’s risk appetite; conversely, if 
the benchmark is unlikely to be outperformed, incentives increase the manager’s risk 
appetite. Furthermore, the evaluative horizon influences the trader’s risk preferences, in 
the sense that if traders performed poorly in a period, they tend to choose riskier 
investments in the following period given the same evaluative horizon.  On the other 
hand, more conservative investments are chosen after a period of good performance by 
a trader. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first time these results have been 
illustrated in the literature using a behavioral framework.  
We tested the model in an empirical analysis over a large world sample of 
mutual equity funds, including developed and emerging markets, and we reached 
supportive results to the propositions established in the theoretical model.  
  Further extensions of this work may include the type of financial institution the 
trader works for (banks, insurance companies, pension funds) to take into account 
regulatory and institutional effects. Also, delegated portfolio management often 
involves more than one agency layer and future work could examine how this feature 
affects incentives? More generally, studies about general equilibrium implications and 
price impact should be interesting, especially for policy-makers, given the relevance of 
these funds in all developed financial markets. Also, the consideration of other contract 
schemes should be of interest (Sundaram and Yermack, 2006, suggest the use of debt 
contracts). Indeed, Mohnen and Pokorny (2004) show that factors other than the 
performance-dependent part of the compensation influence an individual’s effort 
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decision. Their experimental data show significantly higher effort levels for very low or 
very high fixed payments. 
Despite the fact that we use prospect theory assumptions, the impact of cognitive 
biases in an agent’s risk preference still needs to be better understood in order to 
understand the way psychological states may affect risk preferences in this context. We 
applied BAM specifically to the trader’s situation. An extension of this study to other 
institutional contexts would be interesting in order to find some external validity to the 
propositions settled. Also, in the compensation analysis, only financial compensations 
were considered, and we think that including non-financial rewards like recognition and 
prestige would enrich the theory and enable better predictions. Finally, inclusion of 
career concerns in the model could also improve multi-period analysis. Kempf et al. 
(2007) suggest that when employment risk is high, managers that lag behind tend to 
decrease risk relative to leading managers in order to prevent potential job loss. All of 
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Agent’s Choice of Effort in a Passive Fund 
This Table presents the agent's choice of active management effort "t" considering that he works for a 
passive fund. His compensation contract is fixed based (β ) and his performance is measured against a 
benchmark (xb). The risk σ
2 is given by the square root of the tracking error. As demonstrated in the 
text, the trader's optimal choice of active management effort is "zero". 
 
Agent’s choice of t Compensation Performance Risk Result
t = 0 w = β x = xb σ2= 0 optimum






Agent’s Choice of Effort in an Active Fund 
This Table presents the agent's choice of active management effort "t" considering that he works for an 
active fund. His compensation contract is performance based ( β α + x ) and his performance is measured 
against a benchmark (xb). The risk σ
2 is given by the square root of the tracking error. As demonstrated 
in the text, the trader's optimal choice of active management effort is greater than "zero". 
Agent’s choice of t Compensation Performance Risk Result
t = 0 w = β x = 0 σ2= 0 agent is fired
t = t* w = αx + β x > 0 σ2> 0 optimum




Summary of the Equations 
This Table presents the summary of the main equations for the variable pay (α ) in the trader's 
compensation contract, provided in the text, for the special cases of passive and active funds. In the case 
of passive funds, there's no need of variable pay. For the case of active funds, the variable pay will have 
different equations whether we are considering a symmetric or asymmetric contract. 
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Descriptive Statistics of the Funds’ Data 
Descriptive statistics of the funds in the database are displayed. The cross-sectional mean, median and 
standard deviation of the management fee (values in %), the net asset value (millions unit in the country’s 
currency), and the age (in years) are listed, respectively, for each country. The number of funds for each 




Passive vs. Active Funds: Management Fee 
Management fees for active and passive funds for the various benchmarks considered. Indices with less 
than 10 passive funds were excluded from the analysis. The management fee is non-negative by definition 
and in this case we run the test on the natural logarithm of the measure in order to improve the normality 
of the variable. Data from February, 2007. 
Index Passive Active t-stat p-value
'ASX' 0.88 1.18 2.00 0.05
'CAC' 1.39 1.68 3.27 0.00
'DAX' 0.86 1.25 3.29 0.00
'DJST' 1.57 1.52 0.17 0.86
'IBEX' 1.25 1.46 0.39 0.70
'IBOV' 2.07 2.09 0.15 0.88
'INDU' 0.81 2.19 0.41 0.69
'KLCI' 1.33 1.46 1.55 0.12
'MEXBOL' 4.21 4.14 -0.20 0.84
'MID' 0.42 0.88 0.51 0.61
'NKY' 0.78 1.58 4.04 0.00
'RTY' 0.40 1.10 3.91 0.00
'SPX' 0.66 1.08 3.71 0.00
'TPX' 0.56 1.38 7.90 0.00
'UKX' 1.18 1.52 0.04 0.97







Index Mnemonic Index Country OBS Fee Mean Median Std. Mean Median Std. Mean Median Std.
'ASE' Athens Stock Exchange Greece 36 1 1.75 1.50 0.96 106.09 32.41 161.63 10.72 10.08 5.61
'ASX' FTSE All Share Index UK 256 12 1.17 1.25 0.64 272.97 77.12 607.08 13.04 9.28 11.04
'ATX' Austrian Traded Index Austria 32 7 1.28 1.38 0.66 125.11 61.62 155.37 12.35 9.09 8.45
'CAC' CAC 40 Index France 262 9 1.65 1.50 0.70 227.54 59.68 494.75 10.33 8.82 6.89
'CCMP' NASDAQ US (Nasdaq) 40 6 1.59 1.50 0.96 610.58 38.91 1,848.38 9.54 7.23 6.11
'DAX' DAX Germany 106 4 1.22 1.20 0.56 347.06 92.37 742.08 16.52 13.44 11.45
'DJST' Dow Jones US 227 6 1.53 1.50 0.63 100.29 28.95 295.93 7.07 6.45 4.68
'E100' FTSE EuroGroup 100 Europe 38 3 1.34 1.50 0.61 172.12 47.78 711.57 8.77 8.80 2.09
'IBEX' IBEX35 Spain 215 1 1.45 1.45 0.62 78.21 37.47 142.61 9.06 9.51 4.26
'IBOV' IBOVESPA Brazil 337 61 2.09 2.00 1.77 98.87 32.56 187.31 7.00 5.99 6.26
'INDU' Dow Jones Indust US 47 4 1.92 1.50 1.61 237.01 32.25 953.53 7.98 7.67 3.84
'KLCI' Kuala Lumpur Cap Index Malaysia 122 0 1.45 1.50 0.25 145.13 49.51 225.23 11.11 7.42 9.28
'MEXBOL' Mexico Bolsa Index Mexico 80 0 4.84 5.00 0.72 982.81 373.29 1,963.08 10.49 11.52 5.02
'MID' S&P400 Mid Cap US 46 0 0.80 0.75 0.44 1,522.18 140.02 3,499.62 8.24 7.10 5.10
'NKY' NIKKEI 225 Japan 170 8 1.25 1.20 0.69 13,035.77 150.31 50,786.16 10.82 7.98 7.60
'RAY' Russell 3000 Index US 45 1 0.68 0.63 0.51 664.05 256.58 1,121.88 9.09 8.27 6.10
'REX' Germany REX Total Germany 56 2 0.88 0.70 0.55 210.72 67.01 424.07 18.18 16.79 8.93
'RLG' Russell 1000 Growth US 48 0 0.75 0.72 0.40 1,196.50 357.88 2,113.63 17.99 10.47 18.19
'RLV' Russell 1000 Value US 65 0 0.74 0.66 0.53 2,275.07 434.88 6,932.95 13.98 7.59 17.90
'RTY' Russell 2000 US US 182 10 1.06 1.00 0.50 858.81 150.41 3,301.48 10.65 8.92 8.56
'SENSEX' Mumbai Stock Index India 72 0 1.07 1.19 0.26 4,241.40 932.46 7,279.66 9.61 9.04 3.87
'SET' Stock Exchange of Thailand Thailand 126 2 1.29 1.50 0.34 706.07 286.15 1,580.99 8.59 9.55 4.73
'SPX' S&P500 US 1332 98 1.05 0.85 0.75 1,265.58 101.55 7,437.18 11.85 8.61 11.00
'TPX' Topix Index Japan 427 19 1.28 1.48 0.50 14,521.65 1,792.00 60,286.21 8.32 7.02 6.02
'TWSE' Taiwan Stock Exchange China 109 2 1.48 1.60 0.25 1,454.02 897.58 1,565.13 10.58 9.32 3.88
'UKX' UK Index UK 107 5 1.47 1.50 0.63 91.10 13.32 272.76 9.05 8.69 4.70
All 4584 261 1.36 1.25 0.97 10.55 8.36 9.03




Passive vs. Active Funds: Tracking Error 
The tracking error proxy ()
2 1 − β  for active and passive funds for the various benchmarks considered. 
Indices with less than 10 passive funds were excluded from the analysis. The proxy used was non-
negative by definition, and in this case we run the test on the natural logarithm of the measure in order to 
improve the normality of the variable. Data from February, 2007. 
Index Passive Active t-stat p-value Passive Active t-stat p-value
'ASX' 0.05 0.12 2.04 0.04 0.03 0.08 1.24 0.22
'CAC' 0.07 0.17 3.23 0.00 0.07 0.16 2.34 0.02
'DAX' 0.08 0.11 1.09 0.28 0.05 0.08 1.48 0.14
'DJST' 0.11 0.15 2.48 0.01 0.07 0.11 1.38 0.17
'IBEX' 0.00 0.12 6.03 0.00 0.00 0.10 5.42 0.00
'IBOV' 0.07 0.13 2.57 0.01 0.00 0.04 3.37 0.00
'INDU' 0.11 0.09 -0.57 0.57 0.22 0.38 -0.69 0.49
'KLCI' 0.02 0.07 2.18 0.03 0.01 0.07 3.17 0.00
'MEXBOL' 0.40 0.26 -2.52 0.01 0.02 0.16 3.93 0.00
'MID' 0.02 0.18 1.92 0.06 0.06 0.26 -0.79 0.44
'NKY' 0.06 0.21 14.28 0.00 0.05 0.12 15.88 0.00
'RTY' 0.05 0.12 10.63 0.00 0.13 0.13 -1.76 0.08
'SPX' 0.08 0.13 7.23 0.00 0.07 0.11 7.73 0.00
'TPX' 0.01 0.09 16.27 0.00 0.00 0.05 15.39 0.00
'UKX' 0.02 0.07 11.15 0.00 0.07 0.14 1.16 0.25
All 0.08 0.13 13.84 0.00 0.05 0.10 19.24 0.00







Active Funds: Short Term Tracking Error 
Tracking error proxy ()
2 1 − β  for active funds for the various benchmarks considered. The explanatory 
variables are management fee and dummies for past performance which equals 1 if the fund is a loser 
(considering the past 6-months return) and zero otherwise, and equals 1 if the fund is a winner 
(considering the past 6-months return) and zero otherwise. Data from February, 2007. 
Index C0 p-value C1 p-value C2 p-value R2
'ASE' -3.27 0.00 0.00 0.99 -0.26 0.12 0.03
'ASX' -2.76 0.00 0.23 0.08 0.09 0.44 0.01
'ATX' -1.00 0.00 0.06 0.56 0.05 0.62 0.01
'CAC' -4.29 0.00 1.22 0.00 -0.60 0.20 0.14
'CCMP' -2.78 0.00 0.28 0.01 -0.03 0.90 0.05
'DAX' -3.27 0.00 0.75 0.02 0.42 0.15 0.05
'DJST' -3.84 0.00 1.12 0.00 0.65 0.01 0.10
'E100' -2.26 0.00 0.84 0.01 -0.62 0.02 0.25
'IBEX' -4.29 0.00 1.87 0.00 -1.48 0.00 0.34
'IBOV' -2.39 0.00 0.03 0.25 0.16 0.00 0.08
'INDU' -2.25 0.00 0.26 0.00 0.24 0.13 0.06
'KLCI' -3.88 0.00 0.48 0.12 -1.33 0.00 0.19
'MEXBOL' -1.16 0.00 0.05 0.18 0.05 0.08 0.03
'MID' -5.34 0.00 0.83 0.36 -0.97 0.61 0.03
'NKY' -1.69 0.00 0.07 0.39 -0.56 0.05 0.15
'RAY' -4.38 0.00 0.88 0.16 0.28 0.59 0.02
'REX' -0.76 0.00 -0.01 0.65 -0.06 0.45 0.06
'RLG' -5.92 0.00 2.11 0.00 -0.46 0.74 0.19
'RLV' -6.76 0.00 1.73 0.00 1.48 0.03 0.09
'RTY' -4.49 0.00 0.48 0.15 0.30 0.39 0.01
'SENSEX' -4.37 0.00 0.87 0.04 -0.95 0.10 0.15
'SET' -6.08 0.00 -0.12 0.86 0.43 0.59 0.01
'SPX' -4.06 0.00 0.81 0.00 0.63 0.00 0.04
'TPX' -5.96 0.00 1.18 0.00 0.55 0.11 0.05
'TWSE' -6.36 0.00 1.24 0.00 -0.38 0.31 0.11














Active Funds: Long Term Tracking Error (without control variables) 
Tracking error proxy ()
2 1 − β  for active funds for the various benchmarks considered. The explanatory 
variables are the management fee and dummy variables for past performance, which equal 1 if the fund is 
a loser (considering the past 2 years return) and equal 1 if the fund is a winner (considering the past 2 
years return). Data from February, 2007. 
Index C0 p-value C1 p-value C2 p-value R2
'ASE' -3.35 0.00 0.13 0.64 -0.33 0.21 0.05
'ASX' -4.44 0.00 0.82 0.00 0.96 0.00 0.13
'ATX' -1.65 0.00 0.47 0.01 -1.53 0.00 0.60
'CAC' -4.55 0.00 1.45 0.00 0.31 0.18 0.30
'CCMP' -4.14 0.00 0.72 0.03 0.28 0.56 0.08
'DAX' -3.70 0.00 1.04 0.00 -0.28 0.33 0.13
'DJST' -3.99 0.00 0.92 0.00 -0.05 0.85 0.10
'E100' -3.22 0.00 1.38 0.00 0.23 0.51 0.17
'IBEX' -4.44 0.00 1.79 0.00 -1.00 0.00 0.30
'IBOV' -5.53 0.00 0.39 0.00 0.00 0.99 0.09
'INDU' -2.53 0.00 0.25 0.09 -0.98 0.21 0.13
'KLCI' -3.99 0.00 0.52 0.09 -0.39 0.28 0.07
'MEXBOL' -2.71 0.00 0.11 0.30 -0.11 0.18 0.06
'MID' -4.53 0.00 -0.38 0.67 0.89 0.53 0.04
'NKY' -2.47 0.00 0.11 0.38 -0.12 0.44 0.02
'RAY' -4.51 0.00 1.49 0.00 -0.75 0.59 0.18
'REX' -0.78 0.00 -0.24 0.16 -0.05 0.34 0.24
'RLG' -6.51 0.00 1.87 0.00 2.23 0.01 0.18
'RLV' -7.16 0.00 2.80 0.00 1.29 0.03 0.14
'RTY' -3.76 0.00 0.09 0.67 -0.15 0.68 0.00
'SENSEX' -5.79 0.00 0.99 0.29 -0.41 0.45 0.05
'SET' -6.56 0.00 1.87 0.00 1.23 0.05 0.21
'SPX' -4.25 0.00 1.20 0.00 0.08 0.69 0.13
'TPX' -5.52 0.00 1.40 0.00 -0.12 0.62 0.10
'TWSE' -4.42 0.00 0.09 0.80 -0.26 0.34 0.01














Active Funds: Long Term Tracking Error (with control variables) 
Tracking error proxy ()
2 1 − β  for active funds for the various benchmarks considered. The explanatory 
variables are the management fee and the dummy variables for past performance which equal 1 if the 
fund is a loser (considering the past 2 years return) and zero otherwise, and equal 1 if the fund is a winner 
(considering the past 2 years return) and zero otherwise. Control variables for log(age) and log(size) are 
included. Data from February, 2007. 
Index C0 p-value C1 p-value C2 p-value C3 p-value C4 p-value R2
'ASE' -3.94 0.00 0.16 0.48 -0.13 0.63 0.94 0.09 -0.45 0.01 0.23
'ASX' -3.73 0.00 0.77 0.00 0.90 0.00 0.21 0.40 -0.27 0.02 0.16
'ATX' -1.63 0.01 0.53 0.03 -1.66 0.00 -0.43 0.22 0.26 0.04 0.66
'CAC' -3.22 0.00 1.33 0.00 0.32 0.16 -0.18 0.60 -0.19 0.06 0.32
'CCMP' -1.67 0.47 0.76 0.04 0.20 0.69 -1.46 0.11 0.18 0.11 0.17
'DAX' -2.26 0.06 0.90 0.00 -0.21 0.52 -0.53 0.19 0.00 0.98 0.15
'DJST' -1.62 0.08 0.82 0.00 -0.19 0.52 -1.01 0.00 -0.03 0.76 0.14
'E100' -7.45 0.01 1.42 0.00 0.34 0.33 2.10 0.05 -0.09 0.73 0.25
'IBEX' -4.47 0.00 1.81 0.00 -0.76 0.01 0.61 0.31 -0.40 0.02 0.33
'IBOV' -3.51 0.00 0.41 0.00 -0.06 0.55 -0.87 0.01 -0.02 0.79 0.13
'INDU' -1.94 0.23 0.26 0.08 -1.02 0.19 0.46 0.55 -0.43 0.29 0.23
'KLCI' -2.94 0.00 0.37 0.28 -0.39 0.29 -0.03 0.91 -0.23 0.01 0.13
'MEXBOL' -1.40 0.10 0.21 0.05 -0.11 0.14 -0.94 0.01 0.16 0.02 0.17
'MID' -5.60 0.00 -0.58 0.52 1.10 0.46 0.91 0.09 -0.16 0.27 0.10
'NKY' -1.22 0.05 0.04 0.73 -0.10 0.56 -0.42 0.09 -0.06 0.46 0.10
'RAY' -3.21 0.14 0.70 0.03 -1.26 0.30 1.23 0.16 -0.70 0.00 0.34
'REX' -1.04 0.00 -0.25 0.10 -0.01 0.61 0.13 0.01 -0.03 0.05 0.33
'RLG' -3.66 0.05 1.46 0.01 1.95 0.01 -0.73 0.26 -0.13 0.51 0.24
'RLV' -5.06 0.01 2.29 0.00 0.91 0.15 -0.01 0.98 -0.31 0.17 0.17
'RTY' -1.27 0.08 -0.08 0.74 -0.27 0.45 -0.75 0.01 -0.12 0.13 0.07
'SENSEX' -5.28 0.04 0.94 0.31 -1.03 0.07 -1.38 0.22 0.40 0.06 0.11
'SET' -3.84 0.39 1.25 0.05 1.91 0.02 -2.28 0.11 0.45 0.36 0.27
'SPX' -2.16 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.06 0.76 -0.27 0.08 -0.28 0.00 0.20
'TPX' -6.61 0.00 1.04 0.00 -0.17 0.51 1.30 0.00 -0.23 0.00 0.17
'TWSE' -5.13 0.01 0.11 0.73 -0.26 0.33 0.09 0.86 0.07 0.71 0.01

















Active Funds: Short Term Tracking Error (without management fee) 
Tracking error proxy ()
2 1 − β  for active funds for the various benchmarks considered. The explanatory 
variables are dummies for past performance which equals 1 if the fund is a loser (considering the past 6 
month return) and equals 1 if the fund is a winner (considering the past 6 month return). Data from 
February, 2007. 
Index C0 p-value C1 p-value C2 p-value R2
'ASE' -3.68 0.00 1.21 0.05 0.01 0.96 0.20
'ASX' -2.70 0.00 0.21 0.29 -0.04 0.82 0.01
'ATX' -1.03 0.00 0.16 0.43 0.10 0.59 0.02
'CAC' -4.09 0.00 2.38 0.00 -1.55 0.04 0.17
'CCMP' -2.61 0.00 0.35 0.50 -0.52 0.52 0.04
'DAX' -3.56 0.00 1.66 0.00 0.93 0.04 0.11
'DJST' -3.99 0.00 2.05 0.00 1.14 0.02 0.12
'E100' -2.43 0.00 1.29 0.01 -0.86 0.12 0.26
'IBEX' -4.23 0.00 2.83 0.00 -2.95 0.00 0.44
'IBOV' -2.42 0.00 0.00 0.98 0.52 0.00 0.13
'INDU' -2.34 0.00 0.92 0.27 0.50 0.34 0.05
'KLCI' -3.94 0.00 0.83 0.06 -1.93 0.00 0.19
'MEXBOL' -1.14 0.00 0.15 0.48 0.22 0.10 0.02
'MID' -5.21 0.00 0.48 0.58 -1.09 0.48 0.04
'NKY' -1.61 0.00 0.04 0.77 -1.03 0.02 0.19
'RAY' -4.21 0.00 0.91 0.29 -0.68 0.46 0.05
'REX' -0.76 0.00 -0.03 0.11 -0.07 0.30 0.04
'RLG' -5.76 0.00 2.14 0.00 -1.10 0.24 0.22
'RLV' -7.10 0.00 2.20 0.03 1.46 0.11 0.08
'RTY' -4.26 0.00 0.19 0.67 -0.26 0.59 0.00
'SENSEX' -4.48 0.00 1.27 0.01 -0.94 0.14 0.17
'SET' -6.18 0.00 0.14 0.88 0.72 0.57 0.01
'SPX' -3.66 0.00 0.21 0.28 -0.33 0.11 0.01
'TPX' -6.33 0.00 2.35 0.00 1.44 0.00 0.09
'TWSE' -6.57 0.00 2.33 0.00 -0.38 0.51 0.16
'UKX' -2.43 0.00 0.52 0.27 -0.10 0.85 0.02
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